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Why Economic Growth Has Been Weak in Arab Countries: 




■  The gap between the per capita income of most 
Arab countries and that of advanced industrial 
countries has widened since the early 1990s. The 
economic growth performance of the Arab world 
has been weak by developing country standards, 
too. Yet, the diversity of growth patterns within this 
group defies easy generalizations on the reasons 
underlying the disappointing performance.  
■  In some cases, country-specific shocks played a 
role, notably for relatively high growth in Sudan 
(discovery of oil) and the poor performance of 
Jordan (embargo on neighboring Iraq). On the 
whole, however, influences beyond the immediate 
control of Arab policymakers contribute surprising-
ly little to the explanation of growth patterns. The 
relation between terms-of-trade developments and 
economic growth turns out to be extremely weak. 
Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank are hardly 
to blame for imposing ineffective policy 
conditionality on Arab countries, if only because 
the leverage of international financial institutions 
has remained limited in the region. 
■  Economic policy failure in Arab countries appears 
to be a more important reason for poor growth. 
Even though the region has partly fallen into line 
with the Washington Consensus, various Arab 
countries lag behind other developing countries 
when it comes to trimming the interventionist role 
of the state and integrating themselves into the 
global division of labor through trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). 
■ Nevertheless, the relation between macroeco-
nomic conditions, factor accumulation as well as 
trade and FDI liberalization on the one hand and 
economic growth on the other hand remains 
elusive. This may be because reforms have not 
gone far enough and have remained fragmentary 
even in Arab countries with a relatively favorable 
growth performance. It can neither be ruled out, 
however, that some elements of the Washington 
Consensus have been less effective than widely 
expected in promoting growth. For example, the 
enclave character of FDI in some Arab countries 
is rather unlikely to spur per capita income growth. 
This implies that country-specific conditions 
deserve close attention when designing economic 
policy reforms. In Arab countries with low per 
capita income, domestic resource mobilization 
appears to be more important than attracting FDI. 
Even in more advanced countries such as Egypt 
and Tunisia, continued efforts towards human 
capital formation are key to sustainable growth. 
■  Furthermore, policy-related variables and eco-
nomic growth depend on more deeply rooted insti-
tutional deficiencies. Institutions in many Arab 
countries are less advanced than their income 
level would suggest. The experience of several oil 
exporters in the region supports the proposition 
that the abundance of oil encourages rent-seeking 
and exerts a negative impact on economic growth 
via its deleterious impact on institutional 
development. 
■  As a consequence, economic policy reforms along 
the lines of the Washington Consensus are not 
sufficient to improve the growth prospects of Arab 
countries. The call for institutional reforms mainly 
applies to resource-rich countries such as Algeria, 
Saudi Arabia and Sudan, notwithstanding their 
different growth performance in the past. It may 
prove difficult for these countries to overcome the 
natural resource curse, but the successful 
transformation of a country like Mexico from an oil-
dependent to a highly diversified economy with 
more advanced institutions may show Arab coun-
tries the way. 
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Most developing countries have failed to catch 
up economically to advanced industrial countries 
in the process of globalization (Nunnenkamp 
2003a). Arab countries are no exception in this 
regard. Rather, recent reports suggest that Arab 
countries have even underperformed when com-
pared with other developing countries. Accord-
ing to the World Bank (2003b: 22), “the results 
on the ground, and especially growth, remained 
disappointing.” Abed (2003: 11) notes that 
growth of per capita income has faltered in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), com-
pared with the rest of the developing world. 
Furthermore, according to various experts, the 
major responsibility for the poor economic 
growth performance rests with the Arab coun-
tries themselves. Frequently mentioned domestic 
policy failures include the strong and interven-
tionist role of the state, poor integration into 
international trade and insufficient attractiveness 
to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
We assess the empirical relevance of these 
claims in the following. In addition, we raise 
some propositions that have received less atten-
tion in the literature. Apart from economic policy 
failure, we check whether exogenous factors and 
institutional deficiencies prevented higher eco-
nomic growth of Arab countries. The subsequent 
analysis covers 18 Arab countries, namely the 15 
members of the Arab Planning Institute (API) plus 
Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia.1 Throughout 
the paper, a large group of other developing 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
serves as the point of reference, in order to assess 
the relative position of Arab countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
portrays the economic growth performance of 
Arab countries since 1992. In Section 3, we dis-
cuss the relevance of exogenous factors, includ-
ing the geographical distance from world eco-
nomic centers, terms-of-trade developments, and 
____________________ 
1 Due to data constraints, however, the number of observa-
tions varies in the different steps of our analysis. API mem-
bers are: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
IMF conditionality. We turn to an evaluation of 
economic policy failures in Section 4, and assess 
institutional deficiencies in Section 5. Section 6 
summarizes and offers some conclusions. 
2  Relative Growth Performance 
The evidence presented in this section supports 
the view that the economic performance of most 
Arab countries has been “disappointing” (Hoekman 
and Messerlin 2002: 1). Economic growth is 
measured by relating the per capita income (in 
PPP terms) of sample countries to the per capita 
income of the United States (representing the 
group of advanced industrial countries) and by 
comparing this relative income measure between 









01 GNI GNIUS =  
with i = sample countries. 
Accordingly, GNIUS = 1 represents the divid-
ing line between developing countries which 
caught up to the United States (GNIUS > 1) and 
those which fell further back (GNIUS < 1). 
We assess the growth performance of Arab 
countries for the relatively short period of 1992–
2001, in order to avoid biased results due to ex-
ceptional factors in the 1980s and at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. We refrain from consider-
ing the 1980s in order to exclude the peak and 
subsequent drop of oil prices.2 Furthermore, 
countries such as Jordan and Lebanon suffered 
political and economic instability in the late 
1980s, resulting in exchange-rate volatility and 
sharply declining per capita incomes. Distortions 
may also result from the first Gulf War in 1991. 
Yet, the choice of the observation period hard-
ly affects the overall picture of the growth per-
formance of Arab countries. In an earlier paper, 
we found that the income gap to the United 
States widened for almost all Arab countries   
in 1980–2000,  with  Egypt,  Tunisia  and  Sudan  
____________________ 
2 The average crude oil price almost tripled in 1978–1980, 
and fell back to about its 1978 level in 1986 (IMF 2002: 
188–189). 4 
Figure 1: 
Economic Development of Arab Countries 
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aIn percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP) in the United States. — bRelative to GNI per capita (PPP) in the 
United States; see text for details; UAE: 1992–1998; Oman: 1992–2000. — cMedian. 
Source: World Bank (2003a). 
having performed best (Nunnenkamp 2003b). 
Figure 1 portrays a similar pattern for 1992–2001. 
Only 4 out of 15 Arab countries succeeded to 
narrow, at least somewhat, the income gap to the 
United States (the three aforementioned coun-
tries plus Yemen).3 For the majority of Arab 
countries, the growth performance proved to be 
weak not only relative to the United States, but 
also relative to the control group of other devel-
oping countries. 
Four oil-rich Arab countries figure at the bot-
tom of Figure 1, revealing a particularly poor 
growth performance.4 Nevertheless, the growth 
____________________ 
3 The relevant data are missing for Iraq, Libya and Qatar. 
4 According to the MENA Development Report, per capita 
income has increased considerably in the United Arab 
Emirates since 1989 (World Bank 2003b: 24). The data 
reported there are in stark contrast to the data we draw from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a). 
patterns of Arab countries defy easy general-
izations. Resource-poor Jordan ranks next to oil-
rich Oman. Egypt clearly outperformed Syria, 
even though both countries started from a similar 
initial income of 10 percent of US income in 
1992. Bahrain fared considerably better than most 
other oil-dependent countries. Likewise, economic 
growth differed remarkably between neighboring 
countries such as Tunisia and Algeria, or Lebanon 
and Syria. Hence, the subsequent sections ad-
dress various propositions that may account for 
(i) the generally poor growth performance of 
Arab countries, and (ii) the considerable diver-
































Saudi Ar. 5 
3  How Relevant Are Exogenous 
Factors? 
Before turning to what appears to be the pre-
dominant view in the literature, namely that Arab 
countries themselves are to blame for poor 
growth, we discuss some factors which may be 
considered exogenous in the sense that they 
escape the immediate control of Arab policy-
makers.5 Possible candidates are: geographical 
distance from world economic centers, terms-of-
trade shocks, and forced compliance with policy 
conditionality, along the lines of the so-called 
Washington Consensus, attached to IMF and 
World Bank loans. 
The hypothesis that distance from economic 
centers hinders growth at the periphery is firmly 
rooted in development economics. While earlier 
critics of the international economic system por-
trayed center-periphery relations in terms of in-
tentional exploitation, more conventional eco-
nomic analyses regard distance as a structural 
impediment to economic development at the pe-
riphery. According to so-called gravity models, it 
is more difficult for remote economies to benefit 
from international trade and FDI. This is because 
economic transactions between the center and 
remote economies involve higher costs related 
to  information, communication, monitoring and 
transportation (e.g., Fujita et al. 1999). 
With few exceptions, however, Arab countries 
are not handicapped by large distance to world 
economic centers. Figure 2 shows the average 
distance in kilometers between the capitals of 
Arab countries on the one hand and the capitals 
of Germany (as a proxy for the EU), Japan, and 
the United States on the other hand. By this 
measure, Arab countries are located closer to 
world economic centers (average distance: 7,540 
kilometers) than all developing countries taken 
together (8,810 kilometers). Moreover, the 
growth differences between Arab countries are in 
some conflict with the notion of distance-related 
barriers to economic development. Sudan and 
Yemen are shown in Figure 1 to have narrowed 
____________________ 
5  For a more detailed account of exogenous factors, see 
Nunnenkamp (2004a). 
the income gap to advanced industrial countries, 
even though they are located furthest away from 
world economic centers. Economic catching up 
of Tunisia might have been helped by its 
relatively favorable location, but the same ad-
vantage did not prevent Algeria from falling 
back considerably. Across all Arab countries, the 
correlation between our measure of distance and 
per-capita income growth in 1992–2001 turned 
out to be totally insignificant. 
Likewise, terms-of-trade shocks do not pro-
vide a convincing explanation of the disappoint-
ing growth performance of Arab countries. This 
is not to ignore that several empirical studies 
support the view that declining (net barter) terms 
of trade are still an issue for developing coun-
tries. For example, the findings of Sapsford and 
Chen (1999) as well as Lutz (1999), in one way 
or another, point to the continuous relevance of 
the famous Prebisch/Singer hypothesis, accord-
ing to which the terms of trade of developing 
countries, whose exports traditionally consisted 
mainly of primary commodities characterized by 
low income elasticity, are bound to deteriorate in 
the longer run. 
The terms of trade of various Arab countries 
obviously depend on the development of oil 
prices in the first place. Figure 3 reveals the 
strong correlation between oil prices and the 
terms of trade if Arab countries are considered as 
a group. It is also shown that Arab countries have 
been subject to much more volatile terms of trade 
since the early 1990s than other developing 
countries. Terms-of-trade volatility is considered 
by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) to be 
one of the mechanisms through which economic 
growth of oil-rich countries may be impaired.6 In 
the cross-country regressions of these authors, 
higher volatility tends to be correlated negatively 
____________________ 
6  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) do not find that 
natural resources such as oil have any direct impact on 
economic growth. Two other indirect mechanisms are dis-
cussed by these authors, namely the impact through over-
valued real exchange rates (Dutch disease) and institutional 
deficiencies. Overvaluation turns out to be never significant 
in the cross-country regressions. However, resource abun-
dance in oil (and minerals) is shown to have a negative 
effect on growth by impairing institutional quality (see also 
Section 5 below). 6 
Figure 2: 

























































aAverage distance to Germany (representing the EU), Japan and the United States in kilometers. 
Source: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/data/gravity/dist.txt; 
http://www.indo.com/distance/index.html (both accessed in January 2004). 
Figure 3: 
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a1992=100; group averages of net barter terms of trade. — bAPI members plus Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. 
Source: World Bank (2003a); IMF (2002). 7 
Figure 4: 



































aNet barter terms of trade in 2000 divided by net barter terms of trade in 1992. Vertical line divides terms-of-trade gains (>1) 
from terms-of-trade losses (<1). 
Source: World Bank (2003a). 
with growth, but the coefficient is not consistent-
ly significant. In any case, for analytical as well 
as empirical reasons, the terms of trade do not 
provide an exogenous reason for the weak 
growth of Arab countries reported above. The 
typical assumption that small countries are price-
takers in international markets, which implies 
that the terms of trade are beyond their control, 
does not hold for oil-exporting countries. Several 
Arab countries are members of OPEC whose 
output decisions, at least occasionally, affect oil 
prices significantly. 
In empirical terms, all Arab countries taken 
together suffered terms-of-trade losses in 1993–
1995 and in 1998. Subsequently, however, rising 
oil prices have resulted in terms-of-trade gains. 
Comparing 2000 (the latest year for which World 
Bank data are available) and 1992, Figure 4 indi-
cates terms-of-trade gains for 12 out of 16 Arab 
countries. More surprisingly perhaps, 2 of the 4 
exceptions, namely Egypt and Tunisia, have per-
formed relatively well in terms of growth (Figure 
1). As a result, the change in the terms of trade, 
according to Figure 4, is negatively, though not 
significantly, correlated with the growth per-
formance in 1992–2001 across Arab countries. 
It  is only for Jordan and, to a lesser extent, 
Mauritania that terms-of-trade losses offer a 
reasonable explanation for falling further back 
economically. 
In contrast to the more traditional arguments 
related to distance and terms of trade, another 
factor beyond the control of developing countries 
has received much attention only recently. Global-
ization critics attribute widening income gaps 
between advanced industrial countries and de-
veloping economies to counterproductive policy 
recipes of the so-called Washington Consensus.7 
Prominent economists such as Easterly (2001) and 
Stiglitz (2002) have highlighted the flaws of pol-
icy conditionality that developing countries had 
to accept in the context of conventional stabil-
ization and structural adjustment programs, de-
signed and funded by Washington-based insti-
tutions, notably the IMF. By contrast, inter-
____________________ 
7 For a summary, see Williamson (1990), who also coined 
this term. 8 
national financial institutions maintain that eco-
nomic policy prescriptions were essentially cor-
rect and effective, and tend to blame the loan re-
cipients for not having followed external advice 
or having implemented policy reforms at best 
partially. 
It has been argued elsewhere that both claims 
obscure the multifaceted experience of developing 
countries (Nunnenkamp 2003a, 2003b). Major 
elements of the Washington Consensus, including 
macroeconomic stabilization efforts as well as 
liberalization measures, have proved less effective 
in promoting economic growth than hoped for by 
international financial institutions, but none of the 
correlations between policy-related variables and 
the growth performance of developing countries 
supports the view that conventional policy 
prescriptions were detrimental to growth. At the 
same time, various developing countries may 
have refrained from fully implementing the 
Washington Consensus, but most of them have 
clearly moved into this direction, by stabilizing 
their economies, liberalizing foreign trade and 
opening up to FDI. 
Arab countries resemble other developing 
countries in that they have partly fallen into line 
with the Washington Consensus. The subsequent 
section will provide a detailed account of how 
Arab countries have adjusted their policies to the 
conventional wisdom of external advisers. In the 
present context, it is important to note that inter-
national financial institutions are hardly to blame 
for imposing ineffective, or even counterproduc-
tive, policy conditionality on Arab countries. The 
leverage of the IMF and the World Bank has re-
mained fairly limited in most of these countries. 
Few Arab countries have drawn extensively on 
IMF and World Bank financing and have thus 
been subject to strict conditionality: 
−  Just 4 of the 18 countries have received IMF 
financing since 1993 (Algeria, Jordan, Mauri-
tania, and Yemen) (IMF 2002: 18–27). IMF 
loans outstanding to Arab countries in mid-
2002 accounted for 15 percent of the com-
bined IMF quota of the 18 Arab countries, 
compared to 81 percent for all developing 
countries.8 
____________________ 
8 Excluding the high quota of Saudi Arabia, the percentage 
for Arab countries rises to 27 percent. 
−  Some more Arab countries have received 
financing from the World Bank Group.9 
Besides the four countries listed above, Egypt, 
Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia reported 
considerable World Bank loans outstanding in 
2001 (World Bank 2003a). Yet, all Arab 
countries taken together accounted for only 
5.5 percent of outstanding World Bank loans 
extended to all developing countries.10 
Apart from few Arab countries having fallen 
under the sway of international financial 
institutions, countries that did rely on IMF and 
World Bank financing do not appear to have 
suffered from conditionality. To the contrary, all 
five top growth performers in Figure 1 belong to 
the clients of international financial institutions, 
measured by their outstanding debt to the IMF 
and the World Bank in 2001/02. On the other 
hand, 3 of the 5 Arab countries which have fallen 
back most significantly have not drawn on IMF 
and World Bank financing (Algeria and Jordan 
representing the exceptions). 
In summary, it appears that exogenous factors 
contribute surprisingly little to the explanation of 
the weak growth performance of Arab countries. 
This is not to ignore that the previous analysis 
does not capture country-specific exogenous 
shocks such as the negative impact of the Iraq 
embargo on neighboring Jordan. On the whole, 
however, domestic factors, to which we turn 
next, seem to be more important for the region’s 
growth performance. 
4  Insufficient Policy Reforms? 
We consider policy-related variables in this sec-
tion in order to check what Arab countries have 
already achieved in terms of policy reforms and 
where important impediments to growth remain. 
Table 1 lists several variables reflecting the re-
quest  of  international  financial  institutions  for  
____________________ 
9  Comprising the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA). 
10  Their share in GDP of all developing countries was 
about twice as high. 9 
Table 1: 
Policy-Related Variables:a Median for Arab Countries, Compared to Other Developing Countries 
Arab countriesb Other  DCs 
 
1980–1983c 1998–2001c 1980–1983c 1998–2001c 
Inflation 8.5  1.6  12.8  5.5 
Government  consumption  17.8 17.3 14.6 13.2 
Gross fixed capital formation  26.3 19.0 22.0 20.7 
Years of schoolingd  2.9 5.5 3.4 5.1 
Imports  41.5 33.0 35.0 39.3 
Import tariff revenues  13.6  9.7e 12.1  8.8e 
Exports  38.8 36.6 23.2 30.7 
FDI  inflows  1.0 1.2 0.5 2.7 
Inward FDI stocksf 1.0  12.9  4.9  30.0 
aFor definition of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. — bDue to data constraints, the number of observations varies 
from 8 in the case of import tariff revenues to 18 in the case of FDI stocks. The average number of observations is 11. — 
cAnnual averages if not stated otherwise. — d1980 and 2000, respectively. — e1997–2000. — f1980 and 2002, respectively. 
Source: World Bank (2003a); Barro and Lee (2002); UNCTAD (2003). 
macroeconomic stabilization, factor accumula-
tion, trade liberalization and openness to FDI.11 
Macroeconomic stabilization efforts are captured 
by two variables: (i) annual average rates of 
inflation and (ii) government consumption ex-
penditure in percent of GDP. Investment in 
physical and human capital is proxied by gross 
fixed capital formation in percent of GDP and 
average years of schooling, respectively. Trade-
policy-related variables include the share of 
imports and exports in GDP as well as import 
tariff revenues in percent of import value.12 
Finally, openness to FDI is measured by FDI in-
flows and inward FDI stocks, both related to the 
host country’s GDP.  
The first question we are interested in is how 
these variables have developed over time. If most 
countries had refused to implement the Washing-
ton Consensus, economic stability indicators 
would have deteriorated, investment in physical 
and human capital would have declined, and 
countries would not have opened up to trade and 
FDI. However, the evidence suggests that the 
economic policies pursued by Arab countries 
____________________ 
11 For detailed definitions of variables and statistical sources, 
see the Annex. 
12  In Table 1, we consider import tariff revenues, rather 
than average tariff rates, as the World Development Indi-
cators of the World Bank present comprehensive time series 
data only for the former variable. 
have been in accordance with the Washington 
Consensus at least in some respects: 
−  Compared to the median for other developing 
countries, inflation in Arab countries was al-
ready fairly low in the early 1980s. Inflation 
has been further reduced to a very low median 
in recent years.13 
−  By contrast, government consumption, as a 
share of GDP, has been higher in Arab coun-
tries than in other developing countries. More-
over, Arab countries have curtailed govern-
ment consumption only slightly. This tends to 
support the critique of Hoekman and Messerlin 
(2002: 1) that “most of the governments in the 
Middle East and North Africa have made scant 
headway in reducing the interventionist role of 
the state in the economy.”14 
−  The evidence on factor accumulation is mixed. 
The share of gross fixed capital formation in 
GDP has declined considerably in Arab coun-
tries. On the other hand, human capital forma-
tion, proxied by average years of schooling, 
has improved more pronouncedly for Arab 
____________________ 
13 Significant improvements in macroeconomic policies in 
the MENA region are stressed by Hoekman and Messerlin 
(2002: 6). 
14 For similar statements, see World Bank (2003b), Abed 
(2003: 13) and Bennett (2003: 22). Gardner (2003: 20) 
argues that a large share of government employment has im-
paired labor productivity growth in several Arab countries.  10 
countries than for other developing countries. 
Nevertheless, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 
23) reckon that education in the MENA region 
lags behind the rest of the world. Eken et al. 
(2003: 16) point out that education systems in 
some MENA countries remain ineffective, 
with high dropout and repetition rates off-
setting high enrollment rates, even though 
government spending on education is relative-
ly high.15 
−  Trade-related indicators are in line with the 
reasoning of Hoekman and Zarrouk (2000: 2): 
“Virtually all Arab countries ... have under-
taken major steps to implement tariff and fiscal 
reforms and to dismantle quantitative import 
restrictions. Notwithstanding these efforts, the 
pace of integration into the world economy 
achieved by the region has been slow” (see 
also Abed 2003: 11). Import tariff revenues 
have dropped below 10 percent of import 
value for Arab countries as well as other de-
veloping countries. Recent WTO data on aver-
age applied import tariffs underscore that tariff 
barriers are only slightly higher in Arab coun-
tries than in other developing countries.16 
Nevertheless, Arab countries differ remarkably 
from other developing countries in that the 
import share in GDP, and to a lesser extent 
also the export share, has declined. This can 
be attributed, at least partly, to high trans-
action costs associated with international 
trade, resulting from inefficiencies in customs 
clearance procedures, administrative red tape, 
and deficient transportation and telecommuni-
cation services in many Arab countries (World 
Bank 2003b: 95).17 
____________________ 
15 See also Gardner (2003: 20) on low returns on MENA 
countries’ investment in education. 
16 The median of import tariffs applied by 16 Arab coun-
tries amounts to 12.4 percent, compared to 10.9 percent for 
other developing countries (WTO 2003: Appendix Table 
II.B.4). Yet, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 8) argue that 
many countries in the MENA region maintain relatively 
high trade barriers in the form of tariffs. 
17 For recent survey results on barriers to trade and invest-
ment in the MENA region, see Zarrouk (2002). According 
to Abed (2003: 14), “for the MENA region as a whole, 
overall trade restrictiveness (as measured by an index devel-
oped by IMF staff) is double the developing country aver-
age.” 
−  The ratio of inward FDI stocks to GDP has 
soared in both country groups, which is con-
sistent with the worldwide trend towards the 
liberalization of FDI regulations reported by 
UNCTAD (2002: 7). However, the median of 
this ratio for Arab countries has remained sub-
stantially below the median for other devel-
oping countries. This is consistent with Nabli 
and De Kleine (2000), who found FDI flows 
to Arab countries to be relatively small and 
concentrated in a limited number of sectors.18 
Taken together, the evidence points to partial 
reforms along the lines of the Washington Con-
sensus in Arab countries. Especially the failure to 
develop closer links with the global economy 
through FDI as well as through trade in services 
and goods other than oil may have prevented a 
more positive growth impact of reforms (Hoekman 
and Messerlin 2002: 1). At the same time, the 
group averages reported so far disguise consider-
able differences within the group of Arab coun-
tries. 
Table 2 ranks Arab countries for which the 
relevant data are available according to macro-
economic conditions, factor accumulation and 
integration into world markets. The ranking 
underscores that Arab countries, with few excep-
tions, lag behind other developing countries in 
terms of (i) reducing the role of the state, and (ii) 
integrating themselves into the global division of 
labor through exports and FDI.19 Furthermore, 
the country-specific evidence is consistent with 
the view that policy reforms have remained frag-
mentary almost everywhere. Even the top growth 
performers among Arab countries are below the 
median for other developing countries in some 
respects in Table 2: 
 
____________________ 
18 Likewise, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002: 8) as well as 
Abed (2003: 12) point to the limited magnitude of FDI 
flows to the MENA region. 
19 In an earlier paper, we argued that insufficient human 
capital formation is most likely to have hindered economic 
growth in various Arab countries (Nunnenkamp 2003b). 
This may still be true, even though average years of school-
ing have increased considerably in several Arab countries 
since 1980. This conventional proxy of human capital 
formation captures neither the quality of schooling nor the 
importance of vocational training.  
Table 2: 






Gross fixed capital 
formation,  
1998–2001 




Change of export 
share in GDP,  
1998–2001 vis-à-vis 
1980–1983 
FDI inflows,  
1998–2001 
FDI stocks,  
2002 
a. Countries better than medianb 
Saudi  Arabia  (–0.8) Sudan  (5.1) Tunisia  (25.7) Jordan  (6.9)  Kuwait  (3.6) Syria  (20.0)  Jordan  (4.1) Bahrain  (72.9) 
Bahrain  (–0.8) Egypt  (10.5) Algeria  (24.3) Kuwait  (6.2)  Qatar  (4.2) Morocco  (10.4)  Sudan  (3.7) Tunisia  (66.4) 
Syria (–0.7)  Syria (10.8)  Jordan  (24.0)  Bahrain  (6.1)  Sudan (5.4)  Tunisia  (6.0)  Morocco  (2.9)   
Morocco  (1.5)   Morocco  (23.5) Syria  (5.8)  Lebanon  (5.4)   Tunisia  (2.8)  
Jordan (1.5)    Mauritania  (23.4)  Egypt  (5.5)  Oman  (5.7)       
Kuwait (1.7)      Algeria (5.4)  Bahrain  (7.8)       
Qatar (2.0)        Mauritania  (10.9)       
Algeria  (3.0)           
Egypt  (3.1)           
b. Countries worse than medianb 
Sudan (16.6)  Tunisia  (15.7)  Syria  (20.4)  Tunisia (5.0)  Saudi  Arabia  (12.0)  Jordan  (4.2)  Lebanonc (1.4)  Morocco  (26.9) 
  Mauritania  (15.7) Saudi  Arabia  (19.0) Iraq  (4.0)  Yemen  (12.8) Sudan  (0.7)  Algeria  (1.3) Jordan  (26.0) 
  Algeria  (16.1) Egypt  (18.3) Sudan  (2.1)  Jordan  (14.7) Algeria  (0.7)  Syria  (1.2) Egypt  (24.1) 
  Morocco  (18.6) Bahrain  (13.6)   Libya  (17.0) Mauritania  (–3.2)  Egypt  (1.1) Sudan  (19.4) 
  Bahrain  (19.4) Sudan  (13.0)   Algeria  (19.2) Egypt  (–12.6)  Mauritania  (1.0) Qatar  (14.7) 
  Libya  (23.0) Kuwait  (12.5)   Syria  (19.6) Kuwait  (–13.6)  Oman  (0.4) Saudi  Arabia  (13.4) 
  Jordan  (24.1) Libya  (11.7)   Egypt  (19.9) Saudi  Arabia  (–22.8)  Kuwait  (0.1) Yemen  (13.3) 
  Saudi  Arabia  (26.7)     Morocco  (33.7) Libya  (–28.5)  Yemenc (–2.6)  Oman  (12.6) 
  Kuwait  (27.0)     Tunisia  (33.9) Bahrain  (–41.6)    Mauritania  (11.3) 
         Algeria  (10.5) 
         Syria  (9.6) 
         Lebanon  (9.4) 
         UAE  (2.0) 
         Kuwait  (1.1) 
         Iraq  (neg.) 
         L i b y a   ( n e g . )  
aFor Arab countries not listed, the relevant data are not available. For definition of variables and statistical sources, see Annex. — bThe dividing line is the median for the sample of all other developing 
countries. — c1997–2000. 
Source: World Bank (2003a); Barro and Lee (2002); WTO (2003); UNCTAD (2003). 12 
−  Sudan’s growth performance may have been 
supported by its favorable ranking in terms of 
government consumption, import tariffs and 
FDI inflows. However, considering Sudan’s 
poor record in other dimensions, notably its 
weak factor accumulation, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the growth path is sustain-
able once the stimulus of recent oil discoveries 
fades. In the period under consideration, weak 
incentives for the accumulation of physical 
and human capital can be attributed to the 
long-lasting civil war in Sudan. 
−  Egypt has succeeded to reduce inflation and 
government spending, and has more than 
doubled average years of schooling since 
1980. On the other hand, the country ranks 
poorly, even by Arab standards, with regard 
to import protection and export performance. 
Furthermore, economic growth in Egypt may 
prove difficult to sustain, considering that the 
country’s position with regard to gross fixed 
capital formation and FDI inflows has deterio-
rated significantly in recent years (Nunnen-
kamp 2003b: Table 4). 
−  Tunisia is in a favorable position in several 
dimensions, but applies the highest import 
tariffs among Arab countries.20 
The particularly poor growth performance of 
some Arab countries can reasonably be attributed 
to policy-related bottlenecks. Saudi Arabia re-
presents a case in point; reform efforts began 
only in 1999, and have progressed slowly (World 
Bank 2003b: 100). Except as concerns inflation, 
Saudi Arabia consistently ranks below the median 
for other developing countries in Table 2. Yet, 
the relation between policy-related variables and 
economic growth remains elusive. For example, 
Jordan and Algeria have suffered similar income 
losses according to Figure 1, although Jordan is 
considered an “early, intensive, and steady re-
former” by the World Bank (2003b: 97) and per-
formed better than Algeria in almost all dimen-
____________________ 
20  Tunisia reveals the limitations of our proxy of human 
capital formation. Average years of schooling are shown in 
Table 2 to be substantially less in Tunisia than in Jordan. 
According to survey results presented by the World 
Economic Forum (2003), however, the quality of public 
schools and the quality of math and science education are 
rated to be clearly superior in Tunisia. 
sions of Table 2. There may be various reasons 
why policy reforms have turned out to be less 
effective than hoped for by Arab policymakers 
(as well as the proponents of the Washington 
Consensus, in general). As noted before, coun-
try-specific shocks, either positive (e.g., oil dis-
coveries in Sudan) or negative (e.g., the embargo 
against neighboring Iraq in Jordan), have played 
a role. But the correlation of policy-related 
variables with economic growth may also be 
blurred by the fragmentary nature of reforms. 
The latter proposition is often referred to by 
international financial institutions. The World 
Bank (2003b: 5) argues that “halfhearted at-
tempts at trade reform in the absence of deeper 
domestic investment climate reforms fail to 
create much positive impact,” and concludes that 
the MENA region needs to deepen and accelerate 
reforms. In a similar vein, Abed (2003: 12) con-
siders reforms that “did not achieve a necessary 
critical mass or did not go deep enough” to be 
responsible for the limited growth impact. The 
problem with this proposition is that it cannot be 
tested in the context of Arab countries because 
none has implemented the Washington Consen-
sus fully. This proposition, however, is in some 
conflict with the fact that the relationship be-
tween policy-related variables and economic 
growth is ambiguous when a large sample of de-
veloping countries, including the group of Arab 
countries, is considered (Nunnenkamp 2003b). 
For example, domestic factor accumulation was 
strongly correlated with growth, whereas the 
relation between FDI and growth turned out to be 
weak. The latter finding puts into question the 
current euphoria about FDI as a stimulus to 
growth.21 Furthermore, the relation between 
openness to trade and FDI on the one hand and 
growth on the other hand weakens considerably 
if the calculation is based on a subsample of de-
veloping countries with relatively low per capita 
income (Nunnenkamp 2003a). Several Arab 
countries belong to this group, e.g., Mauritania, 
Sudan and Yemen. Domestic factor accumu-
lation appears to be more important than opening 
____________________ 
21  For a literature review and new findings on the link 
between FDI and economic growth in developing countries, 
see Nunnenkamp (2004b). 13 
up to FDI in countries with low per capita in-
come. Even in more advanced countries, certain 
types of FDI are unlikely to yield significant 
growth effects. FDI that is aimed at the exploi-
tation of natural resources in oil-exporting Arab 
countries provides a case in point. This type of 
FDI often results in foreign-dominated enclaves 
so that host economies hardly benefit from 
growth-enhancing spillovers. 
All this suggests that the effectiveness of 
particular economic policy reforms depends on 
country-specific conditions. This does not in-
validate, but qualifies the World Bank’s call for a 
broader reform agenda and the generalized asser-
tion that much faster growth would be available 
if Arab countries went “beyond the shallow at-
the-border trade policy reforms” and tackled 
“deep-seated barriers to trade and investment” 
(World Bank 2003b: 17).  
5 Institutional  Deficiencies? 
Recent research offers another explanation for 
the ambiguous relation between conventional 
policy reforms and economic growth. Easterly 
and Levine (2002: 33) argue that “bad policies 
are only symptoms of longer-run institutional 
factors, and correcting the policies without cor-
recting the institutions will bring little long-run 
benefit.” Likewise, Acemoglu (2003) stresses the 
role of institutions as a fundamental cause of 
divergent economic fortunes, whereas policy-
related variables such as investments and edu-
cation are considered only as proximate causes. 
According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2003: 
34), the primacy of institutions implies that “con-
ditionality on policies [as required by the IMF 
and the World Bank] is often ineffective.” 
In order to identify institutional deficiencies 
that may have hindered economic growth in 
Arab countries, we refer to the widely used data 
presented by Kaufmann et al. (2002). This source 
comprises six indicators, all of which range from 
–2.5 to 2.5 (with higher values indicating better 
institutions): voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
These factors are supposed to shape the incentive 
structure of economic agents. Hence, they are 
likely to affect policymaking, factor accumula-
tion and, eventually, economic growth. 
Nunnenkamp (2003b) shows that it would 
be  unreasonable indeed to assume that policy-
related variables are truly exogenous. Some of 
these variables are significantly correlated with 
institutional factors for a large sample of devel-
oping countries. Measuring institutional develop-
ment by the average of the six indicators listed 
above, better institutions are associated, for ex-
ample, with higher investment in physical and 
human capital as well as more open trade and 
FDI policies. The rule of law, i.e., the protection 
of persons and property, the availability of in-
dependent judges and effective contract enforce-
ment, appears to be most important for physical 
capital formation. Average years of schooling are 
correlated most strongly with effective control of 
corruption and the rule of law. If corruption is 
pervasive, opening up to trade and attracting FDI 
inflows seem less likely. In addition, institutional 
development turns out to be crucially important 
for developing countries to catch up economical-
ly to advanced industrial countries. The growth 
performance improves most significantly when 
developing countries enforce the rule of law. 
Other institutional factors that are shown to be 
relevant for growth include the control of corrup-
tion and government effectiveness. 
At a cursory look, the institutional underpin-
nings for sustainable economic growth appear to 
be relatively favorable in Arab countries. Table 3 
shows that the median of the overall measure of 
institutional development is less negative (i.e., 
more favorable) for Arab countries than for the 
control group of other developing countries. A 
similar picture emerges for all individual indi-
cators, except voice and accountability.22 Arab 
countries compare most favorably with other de-
veloping countries with respect to the rule of 
law, whereas the median of regulatory quality 
and control of corruption is only slightly above 
developing country standards.  However, the com- 
____________________ 
22 This exception is consistent with the finding in the Arab 
Human Development Report that the region performs poorly 
when it comes to civil and political freedoms (UNDP 2002). 14 
Table 3:  
Institutional Development:a Arab Countries and Other Developing Countries  
  Arab countries (18) 
 




Voice and accountability  –0.62  J, K, Mo  (–0.02)  I, Su, Sy  (–1.62)  –0.14 
Political stability  0.04  Q, U, O  (1.16)  Su, I, A  (–1.62)  –0.21 
Government effectiveness  0.05  T, O, Q  (0.99)  I, Su, Li  (–1.29)  –0.35 
Regulatory quality  0.01  T, B, J  (0.78)  I, Li, A  (–1.74)  –0.02 
Rule of law  0.20  U, K, O  (1.09)  I, Y, Su  (–1.27)  –0.40 
Control of corruption  –0.26  T, K, Q  (0.67)  Su, I, Ma  (–1.12)  –0.43 
Average of six indicators  –0.07  T, Q, O  (0.61)  I, Su, Li  (–1.35)  –0.34 
aIndicator values range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better institutional development. — 
bIn descending order; average indicator value in parentheses. Abbreviations as follows: A = Algeria, B = Bahrain; I = Iraq, 
J = Jordan, K = Kuwait, Li = Libya, Ma = Mauritania, Mo = Morocco, O = Oman, Q = Qatar, Su = Sudan, Sy = Syria, 
T = Tunisia, U = United Arab Emirates. Y = Yemen. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002). 
Figure 5: 
Position of Arab Countries in the Normal Pattern of Institutional Developmenta 
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Per capita incomec   
aNormal pattern identified by regressing institutional development against per capita income for all (131) developing 
countries. — bAverage of six institutional indicators; data for 2000/01. — cGross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP) in 
2000 (UAE:1998). 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2002); World Bank (2003a). 15 
parison with the control group of other devel-
oping countries in Table 3 obscures that (i) insti-
tutional development varies tremendously be-
tween Arab countries and (ii) institutional devel-
opment lags behind economic development in 
most Arab countries. 
The large variation of institutional develop-
ment is reflected in that all indicator values for 
the three Arab countries which rank most un-
favorably (bottom 3 in Table 3) are worse than  
–1, whereas the indicator values for the three 
best-rated Arab countries (top 3) are clearly 
positive, except for voice and accountability. In 
other words, institutional development in the Arab 
group ranges over much of the spectrum of the 
index in Kaufmann et al. (2002). Apart from Iraq 
being at the bottom of the ranking in almost all 
institutional dimensions, it is Sudan whose insti-
tutional deficiencies are shown to be most severe 
in Table 3. The composition of the top 3 varies 
more across institutional dimensions than the 
composition of the bottom 3. Overall institutio-
nal development is reported to be most advanced 
in Tunisia, Qatar and Oman.23 
Tunisia clearly stands out when institutional 
development is controlled for per capita income. 
The regression line in Figure 5 represents the 
normal pattern of institutional development 
across a large number of developing countries, 
considering that a higher per capita income is 
typically associated with better institutions. The 
observation that institutions in Tunisia are sig-
nificantly more advanced than the normal pattern 
would suggest helps explain this country’s favor-
able growth performance. Though to a lesser ex-
tent, a similar argument can be made concerning 
Egypt. By contrast, institutional development in 
Sudan is clearly substandard, even when its low 
per capita income is taken into account. 
Figure 5 also reveals that almost all Arab 
countries whose per capita income, relative to the 
per capita of the United States, declined by at 
least 10 percent in 1992–2001 fall below the 
____________________ 
23 Note that Tunisia does not belong to the top 3 when the 
assessment of overall institutional development is based on 
data for 1997/98, instead of 2000/01. In recent years 
Tunisia’s institutional progress has been most pronounced 
with regard to control of corruption and government effec-
tiveness (Kaufmann et al. 2002). 
normal pattern of institutional development. 
Especially for Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, which have fallen back 
most severely since 1992, the evidence suggests 
that economic growth has been hindered by in-
sufficient institutional development. The ex-
perience of these three oil-exporting countries is 
consistent with the finding of Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) that the so-called natural 
resource curse is largely because some natural 
resources, including oil, encourage rent-seeking 
and exert a negative impact on economic growth 
via their deleterious impact on institutional de-
velopment.24 This is not to ignore that relatively 
advanced institutions have failed to compensate 
for country-specific exogenous shocks as in 
Jordan. 
Finally, one may get some clues as to the 
sustainability of growth by plotting institutional 
development against the growth performance of 
a large number of developing countries, and 
identifying the position of Arab countries in this 
relationship. According to Figure 6, better insti-
tutions went along with higher economic growth 
in 1992–2001 across all developing countries. 
Against this backdrop, about half of the Arab 
group has performed worse than their institu-
tional development would have suggested. For 
the United Arab Emirates and, to a lesser extent, 
also for Oman, the large deviation from the nor-
mal pattern may be because their growth per-
formance had to be based on a shorter period of 
observation (see Figure 1 above). The unfavor-
able position of Saudi Arabia is in line with this 
country’s poor ranking with respect to economic 
policy-related variables and its characterization 
as a late reformer in Section 4. Jordan and 
Morocco, which are more advanced institutional-
ly and belong to the group of early reformers 
(World Bank 2003b: 96–97), tend to have better 
growth prospects in the absence of negative exo-
genous shocks in the future. 
____________________ 
24 Note that almost all oil-exporting Arab countries have 
considerably less advanced institutions than their per capita 
income would suggest. See also World Bank (2003b) and 
Eifert et al. (2003) on oil-related rents and the ensuing re-
orientation of economic incentives away from productive 
activities towards the appropriation of oil revenues. 16 
Figure 6: 
Institutional Development and Economic Growtha: The Position of Arab Countries among All Developing 
Countriesb 




























aEconomic growth in 1992–2001 as calculated in Section 2; institutional development measured by the average of six 
institutional indicators. For detailed definition of variables, see Annex. — bRegression based on evidence for a large sample 
of 129 developing countries, including Arab countries. 
Source: World Bank (2003a); Kaufmann et al. (2002). 
The countries above the regression line in 
Figure 6 have “overperformed” in the light of 
their institutional development. This adds to 
concerns about the sustainability of growth in 
Yemen and, even more so, in Sudan. Among the 
top growth performers in 1992–2001, it is only 
Tunisia whose relatively advanced institutions, 
together with its favorable ranking with regard to 
various economic policy-related variables, tend 
to support sustainable growth. Egypt and 
Lebanon are in an intermediate position. 
6  Summary and Conclusions 
Few Arab countries have succeeded since the 
early 1990s to narrow the income gap to ad-
vanced industrial countries. The growth per-
formance of most Arab countries has been weak 
by developing country standards, too. We discuss 
three factors that may help explain the generally 
poor, though highly diverse growth record in the 
region: exogenous shocks, policy failure and 
institutional deficiencies. 
Country-specific shocks have played a role, 
notably for relatively high growth in Sudan and 
the poor performance of Jordan. On the whole, 
however, influences beyond the immediate con-
trol of Arab policymakers have contributed sur-
prisingly little to the explanation of Arab growth 
patterns. Countries in this region are not handi-
capped by a large distance to world economic 
centers. The relation between terms-of-trade de-
velopments and economic growth is found to be 
extremely weak. As a matter of fact, Egypt and 17 
Tunisia have belonged to the best growth per-
formers even though they have suffered terms-
of-trade losses in contrast to most other Arab 
countries. Moreover, the IMF and the World 
Bank are hardly to blame for imposing ineffec-
tive, or even counterproductive, policy condi-
tionality on Arab countries, if only because the 
leverage of international financial institutions has 
remained limited in the region. 
Economic policy failures in Arab countries 
appear to be a more important reason for poor 
growth. The region has partly fallen into line 
with the Washington Consensus. With few ex-
ceptions, however, Arab countries have lagged 
behind other developing countries when it comes 
to trimming the interventionist role of the state 
and integrating themselves into the global division 
of labor through trade and FDI. Delayed and at 
best partial reforms as in Saudi Arabia help ex-
plain why this country ranks last in terms of 
growth. 
Yet, the relation between macroeconomic con-
ditions, factor accumulation as well as trade and 
FDI liberalization on the one hand and economic 
growth on the other hand remains elusive. 
Arguably, this is because reforms have not gone 
far enough and have remained fragmentary even 
in Arab countries with a relatively favorable 
growth performance since the early 1990s. It can 
neither be ruled out, however, that some elements 
of the Washington Consensus have been less ef-
fective than widely expected in promoting growth. 
For example, developing country experience sug-
gests that positive growth effects of FDI cannot be 
taken for granted. The enclave character of FDI in 
some Arab countries is rather unlikely to spur per 
capita income growth. 
These findings have important implications for 
economic policymakers in Arab countries. The 
World Bank (2003b: 2) may be right in arguing 
that “the region now needs to deepen and accel-
erate its reforms.” Rather than applying standard 
recipes to all Arab countries, however, country-
specific conditions deserve closer attention when 
designing economic policy reforms. In Arab 
countries with low per capita income, domestic 
resource mobilization appears to be more im-
portant than attracting FDI. Even in more ad-
vanced countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, 
continued efforts towards human capital forma-
tion seem key to sustainable growth. 
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that 
policy-related variables and economic growth 
depend on more deeply rooted institutional fac-
tors shaping the incentive structure of economic 
agents. Institutional development varies greatly 
across Arab countries, but, generally, is less ad-
vanced than the level of per capita income would 
suggest. While the discovery of oil may result in 
higher growth for some time, as in Sudan, the 
experience of several oil exporters in the region 
supports the proposition that the abundance of oil 
encourages rent-seeking and exerts a negative 
impact on economic growth via its deleterious 
impact on institutional development. 
The finding that institutional deficiencies 
hindered growth in the past implies that eco-
nomic policy reforms along the lines of the 
Washington Consensus are not sufficient to im-
prove the future growth performance of Arab 
countries. At present, it is only for Tunisia that 
relatively advanced institutions, together with its 
reputation as an “early, intensive and steady re-
former” (World Bank 2003b: 96), tend to sustain 
the process of economic catching up. The call for 
institutional reforms mainly applies to resource-
rich countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan, notwithstanding their different growth 
performance in the past. It seems to be exactly 
here that institutional deficiencies are most diffi-
cult to tackle. Yet, the natural resource curse can 
be overcome. The experience of a country like 
Mexico, having managed the transformation from 
an oil-dependent to a highly diversified economy 
with more advanced institutions, may show Arab 








Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variables Definition/Source 
Distance  Average distance in kilometers to the capitals of Germany, Japan and the United 
States; via Internet: <http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/ 
HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/dist.txt>; <http:www.indo.com/ 
distance/index.html> 
Economic growth (GNIUS)  Per capita income (PPP) of country i (relative to per capita income of the United 
States) in 2001, divided by per capita income (PPP) of country i (relative to per 
capita income of the United States) in 1992; World Bank (2003a) 
Exports Exports  of  country  i in percent of its GDP, 1998–2001; World Bank (2003a) 
FDI inflows  Inflow of FDI in percent of the host country’s GDP, 1998–2001; World Bank 
(2003a) 
Government consumption  Government consumption expenditure in percent of the country’s GDP, 1998–
2001; World Bank (2003a) 
Gross fixed capital formation  Gross fixed capital formation in percent of the country’s GDP, 1998–2001; World 
Bank (2003a) 
Imports  Imports of country i in percent of its GDP, 1998–2001; World Bank (2003a) 
Import tariffs  Simple average of MFN statutory applied tariffs for all products, latest year; WTO 
(2003) 
Import tariff revenues  Import tariff revenues in percent of import value, 1997–2000; World Bank (2003a) 
Inflation Annual  average  change in consumer prices in percent, 1998–2001; World Bank 
(2003a) 
Institutional development  Average of six indicators on institutional development in 2000/01: 
•  voice and accountability, 
•  political stability and absence of violence, 
•  government effectiveness, 
•  regulatory quality, 
•  rule of law, 
•  control of corruption; 
indicators range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating better institutional 
development; Kaufmann et al. (2002) 
Inward FDI stocks  Stock of inward FDI in percent of the host country’s GDP, 2002; UNCTAD (2003) 
Per capita income  Gross national income per capita in PPP terms, in current international US$, 1992; 
World Bank (2003a) 
Terms of trade  Export prices divided by import prices, 1992–2000 (1992 = 100); World Bank 
(2003a) 
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